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The Taylor rule has become the dominant model for academic eval- 
uation of out-of-sample exchange rate predictability. Two versions 
of the Taylor rule model are the Taylor rule fundamentals model, 
where the variables that enter the Taylor rule are used to forecast 
exchange rate changes, and the Taylor rule differentials model, where 
a Taylor rule with postulated coefficients is used in the forecasting 
regression. We use data from 1973 to 2014 to evaluate short-run 
out-of-sample predictability for eight exchange rates vis-à-vis the 
U.S. dollar, and find strong evidence in favor of the Taylor rule fun- 
damentals model alternative against the random walk null. The 
evidence of predictability is weaker with the Taylor rule differen- 
tials model, and still weaker with the traditional interest rate 
differential, purchasing power parity, and monetary models. The ev- 
idence of predictability for the fundamentals model is not related 
to deviations from the original Taylor rule for the U.S., but is related 
to deviations from a modified Taylor rule for the U.S. with a higher 
coefficient on the output gap. The evidence of predictability is also 
unrelated to deviations from Taylor rules for the foreign countries 
and adherence to the Taylor principle for the U.S. 
1. Introduction 
The Taylor rule has become the dominant model for academic evaluation of out-of-sample ex- 
change rate predictability. Papers by Engel et al. (2008, 2015), Molodtsova and Papell (2009, 2013), 
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Molodtsova et al. (2008, 2011), and Ince (2014) report superior out-of-sample exchange rate predict- 
ability with Taylor rule models than with the random walk model. Rossi (2013) surveys the literature 
and concludes that Taylor rule models perform better than a number of alternatives. 
Out-of-sample exchange rate forecasting became a prominent academic topic following Meese and 
Rogoff (1983), who argued that empirical exchange rate models which appeared to fit well in- 
sample did not forecast better than a random walk out-of-sample. Their metric was the root mean 
squared forecast error (RMSE), where the forecast error is the difference between the realized and fore- 
casted exchange rate for the models and, since a random walk forecast is simply a naïve no change 
forecast, the realized exchange rate change for the random walk. Because the random walk forecast 
could be performed by anyone who read a newspaper, this received considerable attention. 
The first “modern” analysis of out-of-sample exchange rate forecasting was by Mark (1995), who 
used error correction methods to evaluate Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), Interest Rate Parity (IRP), 
and monetary models vis-à-vis the random walk model with DMW statistic developed by Diebold and 
Mariano (1995) and West (1996). Mark found that, while some evidence of predictability could be 
found at long horizons of up to four years, no systematic evidence of predictability could be found at 
short horizons of one quarter. While the long-horizon results have been both criticized and con- 
firmed, the short-horizon results have held up over time. In a comprehensive paper, Cheung et al. (2005) 
found that none of the standard models could systematically forecast better than the random walk 
at short time horizons. 
Out-of-sample exchange rate predictability with Taylor rule fundamentals was initiated by Molodtsova 
and Papell (2009). The idea is to subtract a Taylor rule for the foreign country from a Taylor rule for 
the domestic country, in this case the United States. The resultant equation has the interest rate dif- 
ferential on the left-hand-side and the variables that comprise the Taylor rule, domestic and foreign 
inflation, output gaps, and (depending on the specification) lagged interest rates and/or the real ex- 
change rate, on the right-hand-side. If uncovered interest rate parity (UIRP) held in the short run, you 
would simply replace the interest rate differential with the expected rate of depreciation to derive a 
forecasting equation. However, there is overwhelming evidence, both theoretical and empirical, that 
UIRP not only does not hold in the short run, but that the short-run effects are opposite of the UIRP 
predictions. The resultant forecasting equation, therefore, reverses the signs of the coefficients of the 
right-hand-side variables from what would be predicted by UIRP. Using the CW statistic developed 
by Clark and West (2006), Molodtsova and Papell (2009) report statistically significant evidence of 
exchange rate predictability at the 5 percent level for 11 of the 12 currencies studied at the one- 
month-ahead  horizon. 
An alternative model of out-of-sample exchange rate predictability with Taylor rules was devel- 
oped by Engel et al. (2008). They subtract the Taylor rule for the base country from the Taylor rule 
for the foreign country, but use posited rather than estimated coefficients and include the real ex- 
change rate in the forecasting equation. We call this the Taylor rule differentials model. They use both 
single-equation and panel methods at one quarter and 16 quarter-ahead horizons, and report some 
evidence of out-of-sample predictability using the CW statistic. They find stronger evidence at the 
16-quarter than at the one-quarter horizon and stronger evidence when the random walk with drift 
is used for the null hypothesis instead of the random walk without drift. Ince (2014) uses their methods 
with real-time data and reports somewhat stronger results. 
The financial crisis, Great Recession, and slow recovery for the U.S. raise questions about whether 
Taylor rule exchange rate forecasting is still relevant in an environment where the federal funds rate 
has been at the zero lower bound from the end of 2008 through the end of 2014. As early as Decem- 
ber 2008, Chinn (2008) posed this question, concluding that, with policy rates near zero for Japan and 
the U.S. and predicted to be near-zero for the United Kingdom and the Euro Area, prospects for con- 
tinued Taylor rule exchange rate forecasting were bleak. A second theme, however, was that returning 
to the monetary model, even in a time of quantitative easing, did not seem promising. Molodtsova 
and Papell (2013) used LIBOR-OIS spreads, TED spreads, Bloomberg financial conditions indexes, and 
OECD financial conditions indexes for the U.S. and the Euro Area to augment Taylor rule exchange rate 
forecasting for the dollar/euro exchange rate from 2007:Q1 to 2012:Q1. The Taylor rule fundamen- 
tals and differentials models with financial variables provided more evidence of out-of-sample exchange 
rate predictability than the models without financial variables. 
The present study has two objectives. The first is to update the analysis in Molodtsova and Papell 
(2009) and see whether the results hold up when the data are extended through 2014. We investi- 
gate out-of-sample exchange rate predictability with Taylor rule models for U.S. dollar exchange rates 
for seven non-euro countries that were considered by Molodtsova and Papell (2009), Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Because we are interested in the recent 
period, we do not consider the Euro countries, France, Italy, Netherlands, and Portugal, but include 
the deutsche mark/euro exchange rate for Germany. 
We estimate 20 specifications of the Taylor rule fundamentals model. Four classes of the model, 
with heterogeneous or homogenous coefficients on inflation and the output gap for the U.S. and the 
foreign country and the model with or without the real exchange rate, are estimated using five speci- 
fications. One of the models does not allow for interest rate smoothing and, therefore, does not include 
lagged interest rates. Among the four specifications with smoothing, two include the lagged interest 
rate differential and two include individual lagged interest rates. The second division is that two models 
with smoothing incorporate the federal funds rate for the U.S. and the other two models use a measure 
of the shadow federal funds rate, the policy rate adjusted to incorporate the effects of quantitative 
easing and forward guidance, from 2009 to 2014. All of the models include a constant. 
Out-of-sample exchange rate predictability with Taylor rule fundamentals does not fall apart after 
the financial crisis. Overall, the models with heterogeneous coefficients provide substantially more 
evidence of predictability than the models with homogeneous coefficients. The models that do not 
include real exchange rate, which we call symmetric, provide more evidence of predictability than 
the models that include exchange rate targeting, which we call asymmetric. As in Molodtsova and Papell 
(2009), the Taylor rule fundamentals models that produce the strongest evidence of exchange rate 
predictability are the models with heterogeneous coefficients that include interest rate smoothing and 
don’t include the real exchange rate. For that model with the five Taylor rule fundamentals specifi- 
cations, the no predictability null of the random walk model without drift can be rejected in favor of 
the Taylor rule fundamentals model at the 1 percent level for 4 of the 8 countries for all specifica- 
tions, at the 5 percent level for 3 additional countries for at least three specifications, and at the 10 
percent level for the remaining country for three specifications out of five. 
We find much less evidence of out-of-sample exchange rate predictability with the Taylor rule dif- 
ferentials model. We estimate 15 specifications, the original Taylor (1993) rule, a modified Taylor rule 
with a higher output gap coefficient for both the U.S. and the foreign country, and a hybrid Taylor rule 
with a higher output gap coefficient only for the U.S., for each of the five models described above. 
The most successful results are for models with smoothing where individual lagged interest rates and 
the shadow federal funds rate were used. For this model, the no predictability null can be rejected 
for 4 of the 8 countries with the original and modified Taylor rules, and for 5 of the 8 countries with 
the hybrid Taylor rule model. The conventional exchange rate models fare even worse. The no pre- 
dictability null can be rejected for 3 of the 8 countries with the interest rate model that incorporates 
the shadow federal funds rate, 2 out of 8 countries with the interest rate model that uses the money 
market rate, 2 out of 8 countries with the monetary model that assumes the coefficient on relative 
output equal to 0, 1 out of 8 countries with the monetary model that sets the coefficient on relative 
output equal to 1, and no countries with the PPP model. 
The second objective of the paper is to investigate whether out-of-sample exchange rate predict- 
ability with Taylor rule fundamentals is stronger during the periods in which adherence to the Taylor 
rule is closer. This question arises because, since the Taylor rule fundamentals model includes the vari- 
ables that enter in the Taylor rule, but does not constrain their coefficients, it is possible to find evidence 
of predictability that is unrelated to adherence to the Taylor rule. Molodtsova and Papell (2009) ad- 
dressed this by examining the coefficients on U.S. and foreign inflation in the forecasting regressions 
but, as shown by Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy et al. (2015), there is not a one-to-one correspondence between 
the coefficient on inflation and adherence to the Taylor rule. 
Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy et al. (2014) estimate structural change models on Taylor rule deviations, the 
absolute value of the difference between the federal funds rate and the rate prescribed by the origi- 
nal Taylor rule, for the U.S. using real-time data, and identify periods of high and low deviations. Over 
the span of data for which we conduct out-of-sample exchange rate forecasts, 1985:M4–2000:M12 
is a low deviations era and 2001:M1–2014:M12 is a high deviations era. We divide the sample between 
t 
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high and low deviations periods, and calculate CW statistics for each period. The results are not sup- 
portive of the hypothesis that out-of-sample exchange rate predictability is related to adherence to 
the original Taylor rule, as the evidence against the no predictability null is stronger for the high de- 
viations eras for four countries, mixed for three countries, and stronger for the low deviations era for 
one country. 
We next consider modified Taylor rule deviations, the absolute value of the difference between the 
federal funds rate and the rate prescribed by the modified Taylor rule, which are also calculated by 
Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy et al. (2014). Over the span of data for which we conduct out-of-sample ex- 
change rate forecasts, 1985:M1–1999:M3 and 2006:M10–2014:M12 are low deviations eras and 
1999:M4–2006:M9 is a high deviations era. The congruence between finding evidence of out-of- 
sample predictability and being in a low deviations era is much greater for the modified Taylor rule 
than for the original Taylor rule. The evidence against the no predictability null hypothesis is stron- 
ger for the low deviations eras for seven countries and mixed for one country. Among the models, 
the differential is larger for the smoothing models and somewhat larger for the models with the shadow 
federal funds rate. 
Although the Taylor rule fundamentals model incorporates both U.S. and foreign variables, the high 
and low deviations eras used above are defined solely in terms of U.S. deviations. Teryoshin (2014) 
uses the methods in Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy et al. (2014) to calculate original and modified Taylor rule 
deviations for six countries in our sample: Australia, Canada, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom. There is not much congruence between finding evidence of out-of-sample predictability and 
being in a low deviations era for either the original or the modified Taylor rule. 
Monetary policy analysis using Taylor rules is typically conducted in terms of the Taylor principle 
that the nominal interest rate should increase by more than point-for-point when inflation rises so 
that the real interest rate increases. Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy et al. (2015) estimate Taylor rules for the U.S. 
over monetary policy eras defined by several Taylor rule variants. Within our sample, the Taylor prin- 
ciple holds from 1983:M3 to 1999:M3 because the coefficient on inflation is significantly greater than 
one, the evidence is mixed from 1999:M4 to 2007:M6 because the coefficient on inflation is greater 
than one but not significant, and the Taylor principle fails to hold from 2007:M7 to 2014:M12 because 
the coefficient on inflation is less than one. Adherence to the Taylor principle, however, is not posi- 
tively correlated with finding evidence of out-of-sample predictability, as the evidence of predictability 
is stronger during eras where the Taylor principle does not hold for four countries and stronger during 
eras where the Taylor principle holds for only one country. 
The relation between Taylor rule deviations and out-of-sample exchange rate predictability closely 
follow Fed policy as articulated by Yellen (2012). The strongest results are for deviations calculated 
from a modified Taylor rule with a specification incorporating interest rate smoothing that reflects 
quantitative easing and forward guidance. In contrast, strong results are not obtained from devia- 
tions calculated from the original Taylor rule and foreign Taylor rules, or from monetary policy eras 
based on adherence to the Taylor principle instead of the Taylor rule. 
2. Exchange rate forecasting models 
2.1. Taylor rule fundamentals model 
We examine the linkage between the exchange rates and a set of fundamentals that arise when 
central banks set the interest rate according to the Taylor rule. Following Taylor (1993), the mone- 
tary policy rule postulated to be followed by central banks can be specified as 
it  = πt  + φ (πt  − π ) + γ yg  + r (1) 
 
where  it   is the target for the short-term nominal interest rate, πt   is the inflation rate, π  is the target 
level of inflation, yt is the output gap, or percent deviation of actual real GDP from an estimate of its 
potential level, and r is the equilibrium level of the real interest rate. It is assumed that the target 
for the short-term nominal interest rate is achieved within the period so there is no distinction between 
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the actual and target nominal interest rate. 
According to the Taylor rule, the central bank raises the target for the short-term nominal interest 
rate if inflation rises above its desired level and/or output is above potential output. The target level 
of inflation is positive because it is generally believed that deflation is much worse for an economy 
than low inflation. Taylor assumed that the output and inflation gaps enter the central bank’s reac- 
tion function with equal weights of 0.5 and that the equilibrium level of the real interest rate and the 
inflation target were both equal to 2 percent. 
The parameters π and r in equation (1) can be combined into one constant term µ = r − φπ , which 
leads to the following equation, 
 
it  = µ + λπt  + γ   t (2) 
where λ = 1+ φ . Because λ > 1, the real interest rate is increased when inflation rises and so the Taylor 
principle is satisfied. 
Following Clarida et al. (1998), it has become common practice to specify variants of the Taylor 
rule that allow for the possibility that the interest rate adjusts gradually to achieve its target level and/ 
or include the real exchange rate in addition to inflation and the output gap. The rationale for including 
the real exchange rate is that the central bank sets the target level of the exchange rate to make PPP 
hold and increases (decreases) the nominal interest rate if the exchange rate depreciates (appreci- 
ates) from its PPP value. We assume that the actual observable interest rate it partially adjusts to the 
target as follows: 
it  = (1− ρ) it  + ρit−1 + vt (3) 
Substituting (2) into (3) gives the following equation, 
it  = (1− ρ)(µ + λπt  + γ yt  + δqt ) + ρit  1 + vt (4) 
− 
where qt  is the real exchange rate. 
To derive the Taylor-rule-based forecasting equation, we construct the interest rate differential by 
subtracting the interest rate reaction function for the foreign country from that for the U.S.: 
g g * 
it  − it* = α + αuππt  − α fππt* + αuy yt    − α fy yt − αqqt* + ρuit−1 − ρ f it*−1 (5) 
where * denotes foreign variables, and u and f are coefficients for the United States and the foreign 
country. Although equation (5) only includes the real exchange rate in the Taylor rule for the foreign 
country, this specification would be unchanged if the U.S. also had an exchange rate target in its in- 
terest rate reaction function.1 
The relation between interest rate differentials and subsequent exchange rate movements has been 
extensively investigated. Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Faust and Rogers (2003), and Scholl and Uhlig 
(2008) conduct empirical research on the forward premium and delayed overshooting puzzles while 
Gourinchas and Tornell (2004) and Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2010) show that an increase in the 
interest rate can cause sustained exchange rate appreciation if investors either systematically under- 
estimate the persistence of interest rate shocks or make infrequent portfolio decisions. Based on this 
research, we postulate the following exchange rate forecasting equation2: 
g g * 
⊗et+1 = ω − ωuππt  + ω fππt* − ωuy yt   + 
ω fy yt 
+ ωqqt* − ωuiit−1 + ω fiit*−1 + ηt (6) 
1   This was shown by Engel and West (2005). 
2  A more extensive discussion can be found in Molodtsova and Papell (2009). 
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The variable  et   is the log of the U.S. dollar nominal exchange rate determined as the domestic price 
of foreign currency, so that an increase in  et  is a depreciation of the dollar. The reversal of the signs 
of the coefficients between (5) and (6) reflects the presumption that anything that causes the Fed and/ 
or other central banks to raise the U.S. interest rate relative to the foreign interest rate will cause the 
dollar to appreciate (a decrease in et ). Since we do not know by how much a change in the interest 
rate differential will cause the exchange rate to adjust, we do not have a link between the magni- 
tudes of the coefficients in (5) and (6). 
2.2. Taylor rule differentials model 
Engel et al. (2008, 2015) propose an alternative Taylor rule based model, which we call the Taylor 
rule differentials model to differentiate it from both the interest rate differentials model and the Taylor 
rule fundamentals model. The difference between the Taylor rule differentials and fundamentals models 
is that the former posits, rather than estimates, the coefficients for the Taylor rule. Using Taylor’s orig- 
inal coefficients and subtracting the interest rate reaction function for the foreign country from that 
for the U.S., we obtain implied interest rate differentials, 
it  − it* = α + 1.5(πt  − πt*) + 0.5( yg  − yg *) (7) 
where α is a constant.3 
The implied interest rate differential can be used to construct an exchange rate forecasting equation, 
g g * 
⊗et+1 = ω − ωi (1.5(πt  − πt*) + 0.5(yt   − yt    )) 
+ εt 
(8) 
where, as in the Taylor rule fundamentals model, the signs of the coefficients are assumed to switch 
and we do not have a link between the magnitudes of the coefficients in (7) and (8). 
Rudebusch (2010) and Yellen (2012) argue that the appropriate output gap coefficient in the Taylor 
rule for the U.S. should be double the coefficient in Taylor’s original rule. While there has been an active 
policy debate on the normative question of whether prescribed Taylor rule interest rates should be 
calculated using Taylor’s original specification or with larger coefficients, it is clear that the latter provide 
a better fit for Fed policy in the 2000s. To differentiate this rule from the original Taylor rule, we call 
it the modified Taylor rule and incorporate the higher output gap coefficient in the forecasting equation, 
g g * (9) 
⊗et+1 = ω − ωi (1.5(πt  − πt*) + 1.0(yt   − yt   )) + υt 
Since the same argument has not typically been made for the other countries in our sample, we 
also estimate a hybrid Taylor rule differentials model with a coefficient of 1.0 on the U.S. output gap 
and 0.5 on foreign output gap, 
g g * 
⊗et+1 = ω − ωi (1.5(πt  − πt*) + 1.0yt   − 0.5yt   ) 
+ ωt 
(10) 
The forecasting equations for the Taylor rule fundamentals and differentials models include a con- 
stant term. The absence of a constant would require the equilibrium real interest rates, target inflation, 
and the coefficients on inflation to be identical in the two countries. Since there is no empirical evi- 
dence to support this for the countries in our sample, we include a constant in all Taylor rule 
specifications.4
3  Engel et al. (2008) use single equation and panel models with coefficients of 2.0 on inflation, 0.5 on the output gap, and 
0.1 on the real exchange rate. Engel et al. (2015) use panel models that incorporate exchange rate factors with Taylor’s original 
coefficients. 
4  Taylor rule fundamentals models without a constant produced much less evidence of predictability than the models with 
a constant in Molodtsova and Papell (2009). 
2.3. Interest rate differentials model 
We postulate the following exchange rate forecasting equation, 
⊗et+1 = ω − ωi (it  − 
it*) + ξt 
(11) 
where et is the exchange rate, it is the domestic interest rate, it* is the foreign interest rate, and an 
increase in the domestic interest rate relative to the foreign interest rate produces forecasted ex- 
change rate appreciation. This is not consistent with uncovered interest rate parity (UIRP), where the 
coefficient on the interest rate differential would equal one, but it is consistent with the carry trade 
literature and with the empirical evidence in Chinn (2006), who shows that, while UIRP may hold in 
the long-run, it clearly does not hold in periods of less than one year. This is the exchange rate fore- 
casting equation used by Clark and West (2006). While they did not specify a sign for ωi, their successful 
results were consistent with a negative coefficient. 
2.4. Monetary and purchasing power parity fundamentals models 
Following Mark (1995), the most widely used approach to evaluating exchange rate models out of 
sample is to represent a change in (the logarithm of) the nominal exchange rate as a function of its 
deviation from its fundamental value. Thus, the one-period-ahead change in the log exchange rate 
can be modeled as a function of its current deviation from its fundamental value. 
⊗et+1 = ω + ωz zt  + νt , (12) 
where 
zt  = ft  − et 
and ft is the long-run equilibrium level of the nominal exchange rate determined by macroeco- 
nomic  fundamentals. 
The monetary fundamentals model specifies exchange rate behavior in terms of relative demand 
for and supply of money in the two countries. Assuming purchasing power parity, UIRP, and no ra- 
tional speculative bubbles, the fundamental value of the exchange rate can be derived. 
ft   = (mt  − mt*) − k(yt  − yt*) (13) 
where mt and yt are the logs of money supply and income in period t; asterisks denote foreign country 
variables. We construct the monetary fundamentals with a fixed value of the income elasticity, k, which 
can equal to 0 or 1. We substitute the monetary fundamentals (13) into (12), and use the resultant 
equation for forecasting. 
The Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) fundamentals model postulates that the exchange rate will adjust 
over time to eliminate deviations from long-run PPP. Under PPP fundamentals, 
ft  = (pt  − pt*) (14) 
where pt is the log of the national price level. We substitute the PPP fundamentals (14) into (12), 
and use the resultant equation for forecasting. 
3. Forecasting and predictability 
When Meese and Rogoff (1983) wrote their paper, the statistical methodology for evaluating whether 
a smaller RMSE was significantly different from a larger RMSE did not exist. They recognized this, re- 
ported that the RMSEs from the models were almost all larger than the RMSEs from the random walk, 
and stated that, while they could conclude that the forecasts from the models were not superior to 
those from the random walk, they could not conclude that the forecasts from the random walk were 
superior to those from the models. It was not until more than a decade later that Diebold and Mariano 
(1995) and West (1996) developed the methodology, known jointly as the DMW statistic, to evaluate 
the significance of the difference between larger and smaller RMSEs. 
An important issue with the applicability of DMW tests to out-of-sample exchange rate forecast- 
ing is that they are only applicable to non-nested models where the variables in one model are not a 
subset of the variables in the other model. Since the random walk model contains no right-hand- 
side variables, it is nested in all linear models. What exacerbates the problem is that, if the null hypothesis 
is correct and the exchange rate is a random walk, estimates of linear models with (extraneous) right- 
hand-side variables will be expected to have higher RMSEs than the random walk model. Since the 
RMSEs should be equal under the null, this produces undersized tests which will not reject often enough. 
The magnitude of the problem was documented by McCracken (2007), who showed that using stan- 
dard normal critical values for the DMW statistic results in tests with nominal size of 0.10 generally 
having actual size of less than 0.02. 
Clark and West (2006) propose an adjustment to the DMW statistic, called the CW statistic, which 
adjusts the DMW statistic to achieve correct size with standard normal critical values when the two 
models are nested. With the DMW test, the null hypothesis is that the two models have the same RMSE, 
while the alternative hypothesis is that the RMSE of the linear model is smaller than the RMSE of the 
random walk model. With the CW test, the null hypothesis is that the regression coefficients in the 
linear model equal zero so that the exchange rate follows a random walk, while the alternative hy- 
pothesis is that the regression coefficients are different from zero so that the exchange rate can be 
described by a linear model. It is possible, therefore, to reject the random walk null in favor of the 
linear model even if the RMSE is smaller for the random walk than for the linear model. That is why 
these methods are tests of predictability, not of forecasting ability, as they are not minimum RMSE 
tests.5 The CW statistic has become the standard method to test exchange rate models out-of- 
sample, and was used by Engel et al. (2008, 2015) and Molodtsova and Papell (2009, 2013). 
In addition to the CW statistic, we use the nonparametric test developed by Pesaran and Timmerman 
(1992) to evaluate the directional accuracy of the models. The test statistic is based on the propor- 
tion of times that the direction of change in the exchange rate is correctly forecasted. Under the null, 
actual and predicted values of the exchange rate change are independently distributed of each other, 
so that the model has no ability to predict the sign of actual values. The two-sided Pesaran and 
Timmerman (PT, henceforth) test statistic converges to standard normal distribution under the null 
hypothesis. 
4. Out-of-sample exchange rate predictability 
The models are estimated using monthly data from March 1973 through December 2014 for seven 
non-euro countries that were considered by Molodtsova and Papell (2009): Australia, Canada, Denmark, 
Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, as well as Germany.6 Our choice of countries is 
dictated by our intention to examine exchange rate behavior for major currencies over the recent period. 
The exchange rate is defined as the domestic currency (U.S. dollar) price of a unit of foreign currency, 
so that an increase in the exchange rate is a depreciation of the dollar. 
4.1. Data 
The primary source of data is the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. We update 
the data in Molodtsova and Papell (2009) until December 2014, preserving the same variable defini- 
tions. The price level in the country is measured by consumer price index (IFS line 64). The inflation 
5    Rogoff and Stavrakeva (2008) criticize the use of CW tests because they are not minimum RMSE tests. 
6  Some of the models are estimated using shorter time spans of data because of data unavailability. The footnotes for the 
tables list these exceptions. 
rate is the annual inflation rate, measured as the 12-month percentage difference of the CPI. We use 
seasonally adjusted industrial production index as a measure of a country’s economic activity. We use 
M1 to measure the money supply for all countries, except the U.K. for which M0 is used because M1 
data are unavailable. 
The output gap is estimated as a percentage deviation of actual output from a quadratic time trend. 
To mimic the real-time forecasting environment as closely as possible when real-time data are un- 
available, we use quasi-real-time output gap estimation, where only the data points up to period t-1 
are used to construct the trend for a given period t. Orphanides and van Norden (2002) find that the 
correlations between real-time and revised output gap estimates are low while the correlations between 
real-time and quasi-real-time output gap estimates are high for the U.S. Ince and Papell (2013) extend 
their findings for the U.S. to 9 additional OECD countries, 6 of which are included in our sample. These 
results suggest that most of the difference between real-time and revised output gap estimates comes 
from using ex-post data to estimate the trend, not from the revisions themselves, and reliable output 
gap estimates can be constructed with quasi-real-time data when real-time data are unavailable. 
We use the money market rate (IFS line 60B) as a measure of the short-term interest rate that the 
central bank sets every period. The money market rate for the U.S. is the federal funds rate (FFR). Al- 
ternatively, we replace the FFR for the U.S. with the Wu and Xia (2016) shadow FFR after 2009:M1.7 
The shadow rate is a better measure of the policy interest rate when the FFR is constrained by a zero 
lower bound. The shadow rates are calculated using a nonlinear term structure model and are con- 
sistently negative from July 2009 onward.8 The exchange rates are end-of-month nominal exchange 
rates from the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis database. The exchange rate for Germany after 1998 
is replaced with a synthetic Deutsche mark/dollar rate, which is calculated, as in Engel et al. (2008) 
and Ince (2014), using the rate of depreciation of the dollar/Euro rate. 
4.2. Forecasts 
We evaluate one-month-ahead exchange rate forecasts with Taylor rule fundamentals and Taylor 
rule differentials. For the purpose of comparison, we also evaluate the out-of-sample performance of 
the interest rate differentials, monetary, and PPP models. We use data over the period of March 1973– 
February 1983 for estimation and reserve the remaining data for out-of-sample forecasting exercise. 
To evaluate the out-of-sample performance of the models, we estimate them by OLS in rolling re- 
gressions with a 120-month window, construct 381 forecasts, and calculate the CW statistics to tests 
for equal predictive ability between the driftless random walk and the alternative linear model. 
4.3. Taylor rule fundamentals 
We estimate 20 specifications of the Taylor rule fundamentals model with a constant, with het- 
erogeneous or homogenous coefficients on inflation and the output gap for the U.S. and the foreign 
country, and with or without the real exchange rate. Table 1 reports the results for 1-month-ahead 
forecasts of exchange rates using symmetric Taylor rule fundamentals with homogenous (Panel A) and 
heterogeneous coefficients (Panel B). For each class of models, we estimate five specifications of the 
Taylor rule fundamentals model. Column 1 of Table 1 reports the CW statistics for the model with no 
smoothing. Columns 2 and 4 include lagged interest rates differential in addition to the U.S. and foreign 
inflation and output gaps, and Columns 3 and 5 include individual lagged interest rates. Columns 2 
7 Although shadow interest rates for other countries do not exist, the interest rates for some foreign countries in our sample 
also reached the lower bound during the financial crisis. For all countries, the interest rates declined significantly after August 
2008. However, they did not decline all the way to zero and/or did not stay low for all countries. For example, the interest rates 
for Australia and Norway were never close to zero. For all other countries, the interest rates declined almost to zero for a period 
of time. For Canada and Sweden, the interest rates stayed close to zero only from May 2009 to August 2010. For Japan and 
Switzerland, the interest rates stayed close to zero since 2008. They stayed low for the Euro Area as well, with a brief period of 
increase in mid-2011. For the U.K., the interest rates declined around May 2009 and stayed low since then (around 0.4–0.5). 
8    Wu and Xia (2016) shadow rate can be accessed at https://www.frbatlanta.org/cqer/researchcq/shadow_rate.aspx. 
Table 1 
Symmetric Taylor rule fundamentals model. 
Country No smoothing Smoothing 
differential FFR 
Smoothing 
individual FFR 
Smoothing differential 
shadow FFR 
Smoothing individual 
shadow FFR 
A. Homogenous coefficients 
Australia 0.055 0.344 1.874** 0.510 1.894** 
Canada 2.427*** 3.544*** 3.126*** 3.518*** 3.167*** 
Denmark −0.516 0.022 0.576 0.469 0.982 
Germany 2.173** 1.341* 2.172** 2.106** 2.652*** 
Japan 1.611* 2.591*** 2.440*** 2.252** 2.391*** 
Sweden 1.217 −0.385 0.799 −0.210 0.982 
Switzerland 1.554* 1.795** 1.716** 1.684** 1.612* 
U.K. 0.342 0.322 1.097 0.800 1.409* 
B. Heterogeneous coefficients 
Australia 3.250*** 3.281*** 3.213*** 3.166*** 3.051*** 
Canada 2.892*** 3.627*** 3.610*** 3.294*** 3.293*** 
Denmark 1.349* 1.233 1.321* 1.299* 0.928 
Germany 2.152** 1.423* 2.120** 1.809** 2.251** 
Japan 0.392 2.308** 2.492*** 1.631* 2.353*** 
Sweden 3.968*** 3.236*** 2.906*** 3.381*** 2.944*** 
Switzerland 1.878** 1.733** 1.991** 1.501* 1.659** 
U.K. 2.384*** 2.834*** 3.071*** 3.106*** 3.200*** 
Notes to Tables 1–3: The tables report CW statistics for the 1-month-ahead tests of equal predictive ability between the null 
of a driftless random walk and the alternative of a linear model with Taylor rule fundamentals (Tables 1 and 2) and Taylor rule 
differentials (Table 3). In Table 1, the alternative model is the model with symmetric Taylor rule fundamentals with and without 
smoothing, which is estimated with heterogeneous and homogenous inflation and output coefficients using quadratic trend 
to estimate potential output. The column “Smoothing differential” reports the results of estimating the same Taylor rule fun- 
damentals model with smoothing as in Molodtsova and Papell (2009), where lagged interest rate differential is used on the 
right-hand side. The column “Smoothing individual” reports the results of estimating the Taylor Rule fundamentals model with 
smoothing, where individual lagged interest rates are used on the right-hand-side. The models with smoothing in the last two 
columns use FFR until 2008:M12 and Wu and Xia (2016) shadow market interest rate after 2009:M1for the U.S. *, **, and *** 
indicate that the alternative model significantly outperforms the random walk at 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively, 
based on standard normal critical values for the one-sided test. Rolling regressions with 120-month window are used to predict 
exchange rate changes from 1983:M3 to 2014:M12. The models are estimated using data from January 1975 for Canada and 
Denmark, September 1975 for Switzerland, and from March 1973 for the rest of the countries. For the models with smooth- 
ing, the sample ends in June 2012 for Germany due to unavailability of interest rate data. The sample ends in December 2014 
for the rest of the countries. The results for Germany are calculated using synthetic Deutschmark/Dollar rate after 2009:M1 as 
in Engel et al. (2008) and German inflation and quadratic output gap. 
and 3 use money market rates, and Columns 4 and 5 replace the FFR with the Wu and Xia (2016) shadow 
FFR for the U.S. 
Panel A of Table 1 reports the results for symmetric Taylor rule fundamentals model with homog- 
enous coefficients. The model significantly outperforms the random walk for 4 out of 8 countries with 
no smoothing (Canada and Germany at the 5 percent significance level, and Japan and Switzerland 
at the 10 percent level), for the same 4 countries when the lagged money market rate differential is 
included (Canada and Japan at the 1 percent; Switzerland at the 5 percent; and Germany at the 10 
percent level), and when the lagged shadow federal funds rate is used in differential form (Canada at 
the 1 percent; and Germany, Japan and Switzerland at the 5 percent level). The evidence of predict- 
ability is stronger with individual lagged interest rates. The models with Taylor rule fundamentals 
outperform the random walk for 5 countries with individual money market rates (Canada and Japan 
at the 1 percent level; and Australia, Germany and Switzerland at the 5 percent level) and for 6 coun- 
tries with shadow federal funds rate for the U.S. (Canada, Germany, and Japan at the 1 percent; Australia 
at the 5 percent; and Switzerland and the U.K at the 10 percent level). Overall, the model outper- 
forms the random walk for 6 out of 8 countries with at least one specification. 
Panel B of Table 1 reports the results for symmetric Taylor rule fundamentals model with heter- 
ogeneous coefficients. The model with no smoothing significantly outperforms the random walk for 
7 out of 8 countries (Australia, Canada, Sweden, and the U.K. at the 1 percent; Switzerland and Germany 
at the 5 percent; and Denmark at the 10 percent significance level). When smoothing is introduced 
Table 2 
Asymmetric Taylor rule fundamentals model. 
Country No smoothing Smoothing 
differential FFR 
Smoothing 
individual FFR 
Smoothing differential 
shadow FFR 
Smoothing individual 
shadow FFR 
A. Homogenous coefficients 
Australia −0.157 0.337 2.749*** 0.350 2.622*** 
Canada 2.209** 3.051*** 2.898*** 3.045*** 3.014*** 
Denmark −0.947 −0.149 −0.065 0.282 0.276 
Germany 1.451* 0.231 1.410* 1.126 1.836** 
Japan 1.447* 2.679*** 2.249*** 2.361*** 2.081** 
Sweden 0.956 −0.420 1.664** −0.249 1.952** 
Switzerland −0.080 0.868 0.817 0.925 0.896 
U.K. 0.540 0.047 0.626 0.608 1.112 
B. Heterogeneous coefficients 
Australia 3.431*** 3.435*** 3.534*** 3.252*** 3.246*** 
Canada 2.629*** 2.979*** 3.048*** 2.757*** 2.851*** 
Denmark 0.823 0.783 0.623 0.792 0.153 
Germany 1.331* 0.240 0.674 0.713 0.760 
Japan 0.835 2.216** 1.993** 1.642* 1.816** 
Sweden 2.500*** 0.726 1.682** 0.616 1.745** 
Switzerland 1.384* 1.445* 1.613* 1.175 1.395* 
U.K. 2.517*** 3.088*** 3.017*** 3.311*** 3.217*** 
using interest rate differential, the model significantly outperforms the random walk 7 countries with 
money market rate (Australia, Canada, Sweden, and the U.K. at the 1 percent; Japan and Switzerland 
at the 5 percent; and Germany at the 10 percent level) and for all 8 countries with shadow federal 
funds rate for the U.S. (Australia, Canada, Sweden, and the U.K. at the 1 percent; Germany at the 5 
percent; and Denmark, Japan, and Switzerland at the 10 percent level). The model with individual lagged 
interest rates significantly outperforms the random walk for all 8 countries with money market rate 
(Australia, Canada, Japan, Sweden, and the U.K. at the 1 percent; Germany and Switzerland at the 5 
percent; and Denmark at the 10 percent level) and for 7 countries with shadow federal funds rate 
(Australia, Canada, Sweden, Japan, and the U.K. at the 1 percent; and Germany and Switzerland at the 
5 percent level). Overall, the symmetric Taylor rule fundamentals model with heterogeneous coeffi- 
cients outperforms the random walk for all 8 countries with at least three specifications. This model 
was also found to be the best-performing model in Molodtsova and Papell (2009), where significant 
evidence of exchange rate predictability was found for 9 out of 12 countries. 
Table 2 shows the results for asymmetric Taylor rule fundamentals models that incorporate the 
real exchange rate. Compared to the results in Table 1, the evidence of predictability is weaker for 
the asymmetric than for the symmetric Taylor rule fundamentals models. The asymmetric model with 
homogenous coefficients significantly outperforms the random walk for 3 countries with no smooth- 
ing (Canada at the 5 percent; and Germany and Japan at the 10 percent level) and for 2 countries when 
either the lagged money market rate or the shadow federal funds rate differential is included (Canada 
and Japan at the 1 percent level). The evidence of predictability is slightly stronger with individual 
lagged interest rates. The asymmetric model with Taylor rule fundamentals outperforms the random 
walk without drift for 5 countries with individual lagged money market rates (Australia, Canada and 
Japan at the 1 percent; Sweden at the 5 percent; and Germany at the 10 percent level) and with in- 
dividual lagged shadow federal funds rates (Australia and Canada at the 1 percent; and Germany, Japan, 
and Sweden at the 5 percent level). Overall, the model outperforms the random walk without drift 
for 5 out of 8 countries with at least two specifications. 
The evidence of predictability is again stronger with heterogeneous coefficients. Panel B of Table 2 
reports the results for asymmetric Taylor rule fundamentals model with heterogeneous coefficients. 
The model with no smoothing significantly outperforms the random walk for 6 countries (Australia, 
Canada, Sweden, and the U.K. at the 1 percent; and Switzerland and Germany at the 10 percent level). 
When smoothing is introduced using the lagged interest rate differential, the model significantly out- 
performs the random walk for 5 countries with the money market rate (Australia, Canada, and the 
Table 3 
Symmetric Taylor rule differentials models. 
Country No smoothing Smoothing 
differential FFR 
Smoothing 
individual FFR 
Smoothing differential 
shadow FFR 
Smoothing individual 
shadow FFR 
A. Original Taylor rule model 
Australia 0.998 0.659 2.150** 1.019 2.204** 
Canada 2.135** 3.233*** 2.666*** 2.858*** 2.592*** 
Denmark −0.821 −0.448 0.289 −0.149 0.497 
Germany 0.939 0.017 0.661 0.628 1.166 
Japan 1.463* 2.969*** 2.665*** 2.727*** 2.595*** 
Sweden 1.583* 0.720 1.586* 0.933 1.707** 
Switzerland 0.968 1.253 1.251 1.208 1.234 
U.K. −0.375 −0.071 0.499 0.395 0.839 
B. Modified Taylor rule model 
Australia 0.589 0.435 1.963** 0.787 2.051** 
Canada 1.463* 2.637*** 2.225** 2.313** 2.204** 
Denmark −1.083 −0.866 0.053 −0.576 0.245 
Germany 0.071 −0.056 0.778 0.577 1.134 
Japan 1.910** 3.261*** 3.267*** 2.972*** 3.221*** 
Sweden 0.921 −0.547 0.673 −0.315 0.758 
Switzerland 0.638 1.330* 1.300* 1.318* 1.299* 
U.K. −0.607 −0.262 0.503 0.195 0.834 
C. Hybrid Taylor rule model 
Australia 1.334* 1.385* 2.161** 1.606* 2.215** 
Canada 1.287* 2.142** 1.865** 2.098** 2.046** 
Denmark −0.061 0.160 0.293 0.363 0.372 
Germany 1.281* 0.390 0.856 0.918 1.346* 
Japan 1.592* 3.484*** 3.375*** 3.152*** 3.149*** 
Sweden 0.714 −0.734 −0.565 −0.648 −0.502 
Switzerland 1.183 1.366* 1.340* 1.325* 1.358* 
U.K. −1.744 −0.553 0.305 −0.061 0.701 
Notes: The table reports the CW statistics for the tests of equal predictability between the linear model with Taylor rule dif- 
ferentials and random walk without drift. The table contains the results for the original Taylor rule differentials model with 
coefficients of 1.5 on inflation and 0.5 on the output gap for both countries (Panel A), modified Taylor rule differentials model 
with coefficients of 1.5 on inflation and 1.0 on the output gap for both countries (Panel B), and hybrid Taylor rule differentials 
model with coefficients of 1.5 on inflation in both countries, 1.0 on U.S. output gap, and 0.5 on foreign output gap (Panel C). *, 
**, and *** denote test statistics significant at 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively, based on standard normal critical values for the 
CW statistic. Also, see notes to Table 1. 
U.K. at the 1 percent; Japan at the 5 percent; and Switzerland at the 10 percent level) and for 4 out of 
8 countries with shadow federal funds rate for the U.S. (Australia, Canada, and the U.K. at the 1 percent; 
and Japan at the 10 percent level). The model with individual lagged interest rates significantly out- 
performs the random walk for the same 6 countries with money market rate and with shadow federal 
funds rate (Australia, Canada, and the U.K. at the 1 percent; Japan and Sweden at the 5 percent; and 
Switzerland at the 10 percent level). Overall, the model outperforms the random walk for 7 out of 8 
countries with at least one specification. 
4.4. Taylor rule differentials 
We estimate 15 specifications for three Taylor rule differentials models described in Section 2, the 
original Taylor (1993) rule, the modified Taylor rule with a higher output gap coefficient, and a hybrid 
Taylor rule with a higher output gap coefficient for the U.S. but not for the foreign country, for each 
of the five specifications described above. Table 3 depicts the results for 1-month-ahead forecasts of 
exchange rates using symmetric Taylor rule differentials models.9  The best-performing model is the 
9  The results for asymmetric specifications that introduce the real exchange rate with a coefficient of 0.1, as in Engel et al. 
(2008), produce similar results. 
hybrid Taylor rule model (Panel C), for which the random walk null is rejected for 5 out of 8 coun- 
tries with at least one specification. For the hybrid Taylor rule differentials model with no smoothing, 
the no predictability null can be rejected for 4 countries (Australia, Canada, Germany, and Japan at 
the 10 percent significance level). When smoothing is introduced, the evidence of predictability is some- 
what stronger, especially when the shadow federal funds rate is used. The hybrid Taylor rule differentials 
model significantly outperforms the random walk 4 countries with the lagged money market rate dif- 
ferential and with the shadow federal funds rate differential (Japan at the 1 percent; Canada at the 5 
percent; and Australia and Switzerland at the 10 percent level). The model outperforms the random 
walk for 4 countries with individual lagged money market rates (Japan at the 1 percent; Australia and 
Canada at the 5 percent; and Switzerland at the 10 percent level) and for 5 countries with individual 
lagged shadow federal funds rates (Japan at the 1 percent; Australia and Canada at the 5 percent; and 
Germany and Switzerland at the 10 percent level). 
The other two Taylor rule models significantly outperform the random walk for 4 out of 8 coun- 
tries with a least 2 specifications. For the original Taylor rule differentials model with no smoothing, 
the no predictability null can be rejected for 3 countries (Canada at the 5 percent; and Japan and Sweden 
at the 10 percent level). The original Taylor rule differentials model significantly outperforms the random 
walk for 2 countries with a lagged interest rate differential (Australia and Japan at the 1 percent level). 
When smoothing is introduced using individual lagged interest rates, the evidence of predictability 
is slightly stronger. The original Taylor rule differentials model outperforms the random walk for 4 
countries with individual lagged money market rates (Canada and Japan at the 1 percent; Australia 
at the 5 percent; and Sweden at the 10 percent significance level) and with individual lagged shadow 
federal funds rates (Canada and Japan at the 1 percent; and Australia and Sweden at the 5 percent 
level). 
For the modified Taylor rule differentials model with no smoothing, the no predictability null can 
be rejected for 2 of the 8 countries (Japan at the 5 percent and Canada at the 10 percent level). The 
modified Taylor rule differentials model significantly outperforms the random walk for 3 out of 8 coun- 
tries with a lagged money market rate differential (Canada and Japan at the 1 percent, and Switzerland 
at the 10 percent level) and with a lagged shadow federal funds rate for the U.S. (Japan at the 1 percent, 
Canada at the 5 percent, and Switzerland at the 10 percent level). When smoothing is introduced using 
individual interest rates, the evidence of predictability is slightly stronger. The original Taylor rule dif- 
ferentials model outperforms the random walk for 4 countries (Japan at the 1 percent; Australia and 
Canada at the 5 percent; and Switzerland at the 10 percent level). 
4.5. Interest rate, PPP, and monetary fundamentals 
Table 4 contains the results for one-month-ahead forecasts of exchange rates using the interest 
rate, PPP, and monetary models described in Section 2. The evidence of predictability is much weaker 
with the conventional models. The strongest evidence of predictability is found with interest rate models, 
where the model outperforms the random walk for 2 out of 8 countries when the money market rate 
is used (Japan at the 1 percent and Switzerland at the 5 percent level) and for 3 countries when shadow 
federal funds rate is used (Japan and Switzerland at the 5 percent level and Canada at the 10 percent 
level). The evidence of predictability is even weaker for the monetary models. With the coefficient 
on relative output k equal to 0, the no predictability null can be rejected for 2 out of 8 countries (Swit- 
zerland at the 5 percent, and Japan at the 10 percent level). With k = 1, the evidence of predictability 
is found only for Switzerland at the 5 percent significance level. No evidence of one-month-ahead pre- 
dictability is found with the PPP model.10 
10 In addition to the MSPE-based tests for equal predictability, we have evaluated the ability of all specifications in Tables 1–4 
to predict the direction of change using the Pesaran and Timmerman (1992) test. Some models perform better based on the 
directional predictability test, some worse, and some the same. Overall, our results do not change when we use the PT test. 
Table 5 Table 4 
Models with interest rates, PPP, and monetary fundamentals. 
Country Interest rates FFR Interest rates shadow FFR PPP Monetary (k = 0) Monetary (k = 1) 
Australia 0.481 0.671 −0.994 −0.311 −0.059 
Canada 1.179 1.386* −0.492 1.139 −0.262 
Denmark −0.931 −0.808 −1.097 −1.143 −0.756 
Germany 0.391 0.163 −0.848 −0.316 −0.280 
Japan 2.579*** 2.030** 0.855 1.554* 0.186 
Sweden −1.494 −1.212 −0.721 −0.587 0.125 
Switzerland 2.102** 1.845** −1.066 1.973** 1.892** 
U.K. 0.376 0.544 0.227 −0.010 0.240 
Notes: The table reports CW statistics for 1-month-ahead tests of equal predictive ability between the null of a 
driftless random walk and the alternative of a linear model. The alternative models are the model with interest 
rates, PPP, and monetary fundamentals. The model with interest rates in the first two columns use money market 
rate (Column 1) and FFR until 2008:M12, and Wu and Xia (2016) shadow market interest rate after 2009:M1for 
the U.S. (Column 2) The monetary fundamentals are estimated with a value of the income elasticity, k, set either 
to 0 or 1. *, **, and *** indicate that the alternative model significantly outperforms the random walk at 10, 5, and 
1% significance level, respectively, based on standard normal critical values for the one-sided test. The interest 
rates models are estimated using data from January 1975 for Canada, September 1975 for Switzerland, and March 
1973 for the rest of the countries. The PPP and monetary models are estimated using data from March 1973 for all 
of the countries. For the interest rate models, the sample ends in June 2012 for Germany due to unavailability of 
interest rate data. The sample ends in December 2014 for all other countries and models. The models for Germany are 
estimated using synthetic Deutschmark/Dollar rate after 2009:M1 as in Engel et al. (2008). 
5. Taylor rules and Taylor rule predictability 
We have presented evidence that the Taylor rule fundamentals model of Molodtsova and Papell 
(2009) continues to provide evidence of out-of-sample exchange rate predictability when the data are 
extended to include the financial crisis, the Great Recession, and the zero lower bound on the federal 
funds rate. The Taylor rule fundamentals model provides more evidence of predictability than the Taylor 
rule differentials model of Engel et al. (2008), and much more evidence of predictability than the tra- 
ditional interest rate, Purchasing Power Parity, and monetary models. 
Since the Taylor rule fundamentals model uses data on the variables that enter Taylor rules, infla- 
tion rates, output gaps, and (depending on the specification) the real exchange rate and/or lagged interest 
rates, but does not use coefficients from either postulated or estimated Taylor rules, it leaves open 
the question of whether finding evidence of out-of-sample exchange rate predictability with the Taylor 
rule fundamentals model is related to central banks following the Taylor rule. 
What does it mean for a central bank to follow a Taylor rule? Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy et al. (2014) es- 
timate Bai and Perron (1998) tests for multiple structural breaks on Taylor rule deviations, the absolute 
value of the difference between the federal funds rate and the rate prescribed by the original Taylor 
rule, for the U.S. using real-time data from 1965:4 to 2013:4, and identify periods of high and low 
deviations. The output gap is the percentage deviation of GDP/GNP from a quadratic trend, and in- 
flation is the percentage change in the GDP/GNP deflator.11 The Federal funds rate is used for the policy 
rate until 2008:Q4 and the shadow Federal funds rate of Wu and Xia (2016) thereafter. The tests iden- 
tify significant breaks in 1974:Q3, 1985:Q1, and 2000:Q4, producing low deviations eras 1965:Q4– 
1974:Q3 and 1985:Q2–2000:Q4 and high deviations eras 1974:Q4–1985:Q1 and 2001:Q1–2013:Q4.12 
Table 5 reports CW statistics for the Taylor rule fundamentals model when the data are divided 
into periods based on low and high original Taylor rule deviations for the U.S. We report statistics for 
the symmetric model with heterogeneous coefficients, which provided the strongest full-sample ev- 
idence of predictability. Because our first forecast is in March 1983 and there is a break in 1985:Q1, 
11 The data are from the Real-Time Data Set for Macroeconomists, originated from Croushore and Stark (2001). Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy 
et al. (2014) show that real-time quadratic detrending corresponds much more closely to U.S. recessions and expansions than 
real-time linear or Hodrick–Prescott detrending. 
12 The breaks and eras are the same if the data are extended to 2014:Q4. 
CW statistics for Taylor rule fundamentals models: deviations from original Taylor rule for the U.S. 
Country  Deviations No 
smoothing 
Smoothing 
differential FFR 
Smoothing 
individual FFR 
Smoothing 
differential 
shadow FFR 
Smoothing 
individual 
shadow FFR 
Australia 1985:M4–2000:M12 Low 0.602 0.656 0.919 0.561 0.857 
2001:M1–2014:M12 High 3.387*** 3.367*** 3.063*** 3.273*** 2.900*** 
Canada 1985:M4–2000:M12 Low 1.180 2.451*** 2.554*** 1.780** 1.867** 
2001:M1–2014:M12 High 2.581*** 2.909*** 2.939*** 2.831*** 2.827*** 
Denmark 1985:M4–2000:M12 Low −0.020 −0.124 0.192 −0.149 −0.286 
2001:M1–2014:M12 High 1.846** 1.906** 1.655** 2.070** 1.662* 
Germany 1985:M4–2000:M12 Low −0.285 −0.180 0.945 0.325 1.092 
2001:M1–2014:M12 High 2.787*** 2.449*** 2.167** 2.430*** 2.220** 
Japan 1985:M4–2000:M12 Low −0.353 1.735** 2.099** 0.832 1.921** 
2001:M1–2014:M12 High 1.498* 1.990** 1.812** 1.963** 1.797** 
Sweden 1985:M4–2000:M12 Low 0.351 −0.757 −1.275 −0.627 −1.282 
2001:M1–2014:M12 High 4.052*** 3.782*** 3.306*** 3.872*** 3.326*** 
Switzerland 1985:M4–2000:M12 Low 1.097 1.333* 1.912** 1.149 1.680** 
2001:M1–2014:M12 High 1.759** 1.135 0.671 0.992 0.413 
U.K. 1985:M4–2000:M12 Low 1.175 1.501* 1.670** 1.680** 1.820** 
2001:M1–2014:M12 High 1.911** 1.817** 1.999** 2.085** 2.152** 
Notes: The table reports the CW statistics for the tests of equal predictability between the linear model with modified Taylor 
rule fundamentals and random walk without drift. The table contains the results for the periods of high and low deviations of 
the Fed from the original Taylor rule fundamentals model with coefficients of 1.5 on inflation and 0.5 on the output gap for 
both countries. *, **, and *** denote test statistics significant at 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively, based on standard normal crit- 
ical values for the CW statistic. Also, see notes to Table 1. 
we call 1985:M4–2000:M12 a low deviations period and 2001:M1–2014:M12 a high deviations period. 
The results do not support the hypothesis that out-of-sample exchange rate predictability with Taylor 
rule fundamentals is more successful during periods with closer adherence to the original Taylor rule. 
Switzerland is the only country for which the evidence of exchange rate predictability is stronger during 
periods of low Taylor rule deviations.13 For Australia, Denmark, Germany, and Sweden, the evidence 
of predictability is stronger during the period of high Taylor rule deviations and, for Canada, Japan, 
and the United Kingdom, the evidence of predictability is about the same in the high and low devia- 
tions periods.14
Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy et al. (2014) also calculate deviations from a modified Taylor rule with an output 
gap coefficient of 1.0 instead of 0.5. The tests identify significant breaks in 1977:Q4, 1984:Q4, and 1999:Q1, 
and 2006:Q3, producing low deviations eras 1965:Q4–1977:Q4, 1985:Q1–1999:Q1, and 2006:Q4– 
2013:Q4 and high deviations eras 1978:Q1–1984:Q4 and 1999:Q2–2006:Q3. Within the period covered 
by our forecasts, this produces low deviations eras 1985:M1–1999:M3 and 2006:M10–2014:M12 and 
a high deviations era 1999:M4–2006:M9. 
Table 6 reports CW and PT statistics for the Taylor rule fundamentals model when the data are divided 
into periods based on low and high modified Taylor rule deviations for the U.S. Table 6A reports the 
CW and PT statistics for the three sub-periods, and Table 6B combines the two low deviations periods 
into one era. The results strongly support the hypothesis that out-of-sample exchange rate predict- 
ability with Taylor rule fundamentals is more successful during periods with closer adherence to the 
modified Taylor rule. The results are clearest in Table 6B. For Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, the evidence of predictability is stronger during the periods of 
low Taylor rule deviations than during the period of high Taylor rule deviations for virtually every model.15 
For Denmark, there is weak (10 percent) evidence of predictability during the 2006:M10–2014:M12 
13 Based on the results with the PT test, Taylor rule fundamentals also predict the direction of exchange rate better during 
periods of high Taylor rule deviations for all the countries except Switzerland. 
14 Since we do not know of a test to formally compare the CW statistic across the same model and different time periods, the 
statements of “stronger” and “weaker” evidence are based on visual examination of the results. 
15 The only exception among the 35 cases (7 countries times 5 models) is for the no smoothing model for Japan. 
Table 5 
Table 6 
CW statistics for Taylor rule fundamentals models: deviations from modified Taylor rule for the U.S. 
Country Deviations     No smoothing Smoothing 
differential FFR 
Smoothing 
individual FFR 
Smoothing differential 
shadow FFR 
Smoothing individual 
shadow FFR 
CW PT CW PT CW PT CW PT CW PT 
(A) 
Australia 
1985:M1–1999:M3 Low 1.141 0.066 1.288* 0.082 1.503* 0.257 1.165 0.957 1.572* 1.833* 
1999:M4–2006:M9 High 1.254 0.857 1.501* 1.598 1.776** 0.451 1.409* 1.405 1.140 0.212 
2006:M10–2014:M12 Low 3.074*** 2.071** 2.921*** 2.071** 2.466*** 2.055** 2.894*** 1.942* 2.520*** 1.962** 
Canada 
1985:M1–1999:M3 Low 1.797** 0.930 2.784*** 0.879 2.796*** 0.785 2.160** 0.930 2.202** 0.709 
1999:M4–2006:M9 High 1.473* 0.336 1.485* −0.322 1.591* 0.161 1.360* −0.929 1.268 −1.508 
2006:M10–2014:M12 Low 2.083** 1.000 2.499*** 0.888 2.513***      −0.432 2.466*** 1.385 2.512*** 0.512 
Denmark 
1985:M1–1999:M3 Low 0.254 −1.087 0.215 −0.171 0.332 −0.357 0.233 0.417 0.015 −0.154 
1999:M4–2006:M9 High 0.822 0.135 0.411 −0.248 0.523 −0.516 0.281 0.198 −0.081 −1.331 
2006:M10–2014:M12 Low 1.414* 2.014** 1.564* 1.944* 1.482* 1.842* 1.753** 1.863* 1.544* 1.944* 
Germany 
1985:M1–1999:M3 Low 0.052 −2.889 −0.062 −2.043 0.751 −0.507 0.657 0.126 1.116 −0.052 
1999:M4–2006:M9 High 0.581 1.955* 0.431 1.155 1.099 1.155 0.264 1.002 0.876 1.673* 
2006:M10–2014:M12 Low 2.801*** 2.435** 2.643*** 2.851*** 2.326*** 2.641*** 2.604*** 1.022 2.193** 1.146 
Japan 
1985:M1–1999:M3 Low −0.241 −1.432 1.753** 0.253 2.712***      −0.459 1.029 −0.066 2.590***      −0.309 
1999:M4–2006:M9 High −0.289 −0.516 0.959 −0.316 0.113 −0.300 0.507 −0.579 −0.129 −0.605 
2006:M10–2014:M12 Low 1.590* 2.561** 1.747** 2.756*** 1.506* 2.545** 1.731** 2.756*** 1.541* 2.756*** 
Sweden 
1985:M1–1999:M3 Low 0.128 0.356 −0.755 0.131 −1.143 0.641 −0.656 0.283 −1.274 −0.376 
1999:M4–2006:M9 High 1.814** 1.206 1.445* 0.652 1.182 0.879 1.519* 1.843* 1.273 0.515 
2006:M10–2014:M12 Low 3.785*** 4.606*** 3.691*** 3.430*** 3.185*** 3.605*** 3.731*** 3.233*** 3.196*** 3.580*** 
Switzerland 
1985:M1–1999:M3 Low 1.210 −1.169 1.532* 0.258 1.729** 0.616 1.392* 0.801 1.596* 0.258 
1999:M4–2006:M9 High 1.141 0.152 0.198 −0.570 0.360 −0.420 −0.086 −0.517 −0.124 −1.753 
2006:M10–2014:M12 Low 1.134 0.633 0.861 0.158 1.034 −0.107 0.775 0.667 0.883 1.369 
U.K. 
1985:M1–1999:M3 Low 1.138 −0.812 1.481* 0.355 1.538* 0.852 1.625* 0.868 1.703** 0.738 
(continued on next page) 
Table 6 (continued) 
C 
(B) 
Australia 
85:M1–99M3 and 06:M10–14M12 Low 3.171*** 1.807* 3.103*** 1.840* 2.863*** 1.917* 3.017*** 2.311** 2.943*** 2.962*** 
99:M4–06:M9 High 1.254 0.857 1.501* 1.598 1.776** 0.451 1.409* 1.405 1.140 1.212 
Canada 
85:M1–99M3 and 06:M10–14M12 Low 2.564*** 0.959 3.323*** 0.890 3.248*** 0.266 3.018*** 1.164 3.044*** 0.703 
99:M4–06:M9 High 1.473* 0.336 1.485* −0.322 1.591** 0.161 1.360* −0.929 1.268 −1.508 
Denmark 
85:M1–99M3 and 06:M10–14M12 Low 1.115 0.407 1.163 1.046 1.223 0.884 1.281* 1.393 0.992 1.041 
99:M4–06:M9 High 0.822 0.135 0.411 −0.248 0.523 −0.516 0.281 0.198 −0.081 −1.331 
Germany 
85:M1–99M3 and 06:M10–14M12 Low 1.740** −0.513 1.385* 0.499 1.813** 1.360 1.918** 1.352 2.084** 0.659 
99:M4–06:M9 High 0.581 1.955* 0.431 1.155 1.099 1.155 0.264 1.002 0.876 1.673* 
Japan 
85:M1–99M3 and 06:M10–14M12 Low 0.700 0.708 2.438*** 1.986** 3.089*** 1.351 1.874** 1.661* 3.000*** 1.447 
99:M4–06:M9 High −0.282 −0.517 0.958 −0.316 0.113 −0.300 0.507 −0.579 −0.129 −0.605 
Sweden 
85:M1–99M3 and 06:M10–14M12 Low 3.159*** 2.783*** 2.558*** 2.381** 2.347*** 2.762*** 2.670*** 2.258** 2.362*** 1.860* 
99:M4–06:M9 High 1.814** 1.206 1.445* 0.652 1.182 0.879 1.519* 1.843* 1.273 0.515 
Switzerland 
85:M1–99M3 and 06:M10–14M12 Low 1.618* −0.429 1.756** 0.305 2.010** 0.408 1.592* 1.050 1.822** 1.097 
99:M4–06:M9 High 1.141 0.152 0.198 −0.570 0.360 −0.420 −0.086 −0.517 −0.124 −1.753 
U.K. 
85:M1–99M3 and 06:M10–14M12 Low 1.794** 0.169 2.291** 1.145 2.336*** 1.187 2.521*** 1.903* 2.530*** 2.169** 
99:M4–06:M9 High 0.748 1.014 0.478 0.793 1.060 0.380 0.779 0.807 1.005 1.014 
Notes: The table reports the CW statistics for the tests of equal predictability between the linear model with modified Taylor rule fundamentals and random walk without drift, and the PT 
statistics for directional accuracy. The table contains the results for the periods of high and low deviations of the Fed from the modified Taylor rule fundamentals model with coef- ficients 
of 1.5 on inflation and 1.0 on the output gap for both countries. *, **, and *** denote test statistics significant at 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively, based on standard normal critical values 
for the CW and PT statistic. Also, see notes to Table 1. 
untry Deviations     No smoothing Smoothing Smoothing Smoothing differential Smoothing individual 
differential FFR individual FFR shadow FFR shadow FFR 
CW PT CW PT CW PT CW PT CW PT 
1999:M4–2006:M9 High 0.748 1.014 0.478 0.793 1.060 0.380 0.779 0.807 1.005 1.014 
2006:M10–2014:M12 Low 2.082*** 1.496 1.986** 1.519 2.031** 0.861 2.197** 2.382** 2.173** 3.001***  
Table 7 
CW statistics for Taylor rule fundamentals models: deviations from original Taylor rule for different countries. 
Country Deviations No 
smoothing 
Smoothing 
differential 
FFR 
Smoothing 
individual 
FFR 
Smoothing 
differential 
shadow FFR 
Smoothing 
individual 
shadow FFR 
Australia 
1993:M10–2000:M9 Low −0.662 0.212 1.911** −0.133 1.581* 
83:M3–93:M9 and 
00:M10–14:M12 
High 3.384*** 3.298*** 2.887*** 3.238*** 2.802*** 
Canada 
1983:M3–2000:M3 Low 1.699** 2.769*** 2.855*** 2.132** 2.207** 
2000:M4–2014:M12 High 2.475*** 2.857*** 2.907*** 2.775*** 2.780*** 
Japan 
1986:M4–1994:M3 High −0.362 0.752 0.856 0.688 0.887 
1999:M4–2005:M3 Low −0.658 1.479* 1.748** 0.459 1.493* 
2005:M4–2014:M12 Intermediate 1.830** 1.963** 1.802** 1.950** 1.851** 
Sweden 
94:M7–02:M3 and 10:M1– 
14:M12 
Low 2.865*** 3.391*** 1.748** 2.459*** 1.752** 
2002:M4–2009:M12 
Switzerland 
No break 
High 
Intermediate 
2.604*** 
1.878** 
2.585*** 
1.733** 
2.708*** 
1.991** 
2.610*** 
1.501** 
2.710*** 
1.659** 
U.K. 
1983:M3–1988:M6 Intermediate 2.093** 3.036*** 2.875*** 2.767*** 2.657*** 
1988:M7–2014:M12 Low 1.799** 1.808** 2.133** 2.221** 2.391*** 
Notes: The table reports the CW statistics for the tests of equal predictability between the linear model with original Taylor 
rule fundamentals and random walk without drift. The table contains the results for the periods of high, low, and intermedi- 
ate deviations of the foreign country’s central bank from the original Taylor rule fundamentals model with coefficients of 1.5 
on inflation and 0.5 on the output gap for both countries. *, **, and *** denote test statistics significant at 10, 5, and 1% level, 
respectively, based on standard normal critical values for the CW statistic. Also, see notes to Table 1. 
low deviations period across all models that disappears when it is combined with the 1985:M1– 
1999:M3 low deviations period.16 For Australia, Japan, Sweden, and the U.K., the results with the PT 
test in Table 6B support our findings with the CW test. The only exception is for the no smoothing 
model and the model with smoothing that uses shadow FFR for Germany.17 
The result that evidence of out-of-sample exchange rate predictability is stronger during periods 
of low deviations than during periods of high deviations for the modified, but not the original, Taylor 
rule is based on deviations calculated for the U.S. Teryoshin (2014), using real-time data from Fernandez 
et al. (2011), uses Bai and Perron (1998) methodology to identify periods of high and low deviations 
from both the original and modified Taylor rule for 10 additional countries, including six countries, 
Australia, Canada, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, studied in this paper. We use 
his country-by-country results to investigate whether the results obtained using U.S. data extend to 
other countries’ data. 
The results for the original Taylor rule are reported in Table 7. The dates of the high and low de- 
viations eras are different country-by-country and, unlike for the U.S., there are also some intermediate 
eras. The results do not support the hypothesis that out-of-sample exchange rate predictability with 
Taylor rule fundamentals is more successful during periods with closer adherence to the original Taylor 
rule. Japan is the only country for which the evidence of exchange rate predictability is stronger during 
periods of low and intermediate Taylor rule deviations and Australia is the only country for which 
the evidence of predictability is stronger during periods of high deviations. The evidence is mixed for 
16 The exception to this statement is that, for the specification with smoothing, lagged interest rate differentials, and the shadow 
federal funds rate, the rejection is at the 5 percent level for the 2006:M10–2014:M12 period. 
17 For Germany, evidence of significant directional predictability during the 2006:M10–2014:M12 low deviation period for 
the specifications with no smoothing, and with smoothing with lagged individual and differential interest rates in Table 6A 
disappears when it is combined with the low deviation period of 1985:M1–1999:M3 in Table 6B. 
Table 8 
CW statistics for Taylor rule fundamentals models: deviations from modified Taylor rule for different countries. 
Country Deviations No 
smoothing 
Smoothing 
differential 
FFR 
Smoothing 
individual 
FFR 
Smoothing 
differential 
shadow FFR 
Smoothing 
individual 
shadow FFR 
Australia 
83:M3–99:M3 and 09:M9–14:M12 Low 1.744** 1.802** 1.849** 1.667** 1.918** 
1999:M4–2009:M6 High 2.889*** 2.882*** 2.710*** 2.872*** 2.418*** 
Canada 
1983:M3–1999:M12 Low 1.707** 2.769*** 2.834*** 2.135** 2.199** 
2000:M1–2006:M12 High 1.387* 1.446* 1.847** 1.285* 1.546* 
2007:M1–2014:M12 Intermediate 2.148** 2.522*** 2.371*** 2.506*** 2.392*** 
Japan 
1993:M10–2005:M3 Low −0.679 1.431* 1.692* 0.436 1.441* 
83:M3–93:M9 and 05:M4–14:M12 High 1.048 1.819** 1.841** 1.707** 1.861** 
Sweden 
94:M4–01:M3 and 09:M06–14:M12 Low 3.636*** 3.428*** 2.547*** 3.496*** 2.511*** 
2001:M4–2009:M6 High 1.994** 1.924** 2.101** 1.955** 2.125** 
Switzerland 
95:M4–00:M6 and 09:M10–14:M12 Low −0.076 0.043 1.383* −0.145 1.435* 
2000:M7–2006:M3 Intermediate 1.832** 0.908 −0.273 0.717 −0.655 
90:M1–95:M3 and 06:M4–09:M9 High 0.769 0.897 1.176 0.894 0.989 
U.K. 
90:M1–96:M12 and 05:M1–14:M12 Low 1.578* 1.698** 1.922** 2.028** 2.147** 
1983:M3–1989:M12 High 2.079** 2.792*** 2.479*** 2.563*** 2.278*** 
1997:M1–2004:M12 Intermediate 0.959 0.673 1.129 1.005 1.283* 
Notes: The table reports the CW statistics for the tests of equal predictability between the linear model with modified Taylor 
rule fundamentals and random walk without drift. The table contains the results for the periods of high, low, and intermedi- 
ate deviations of the foreign country’s central bank from the modified Taylor rule fundamentals model with coefficients of 1.5 
on inflation and 1.0 on the output gap for both countries. *, **, and *** denote test statistics significant at 10, 5, and 1% level, 
respectively, based on standard normal critical values for the CW statistic. Also, see notes to Table 1. 
Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, and there are no significant structural breaks, and there- 
fore no distinct eras, for Switzerland.18 
The results for the modified Taylor rule are reported in Table 8. The results do not support the hy- 
pothesis that out-of-sample exchange rate predictability with Taylor rule fundamentals is more successful 
during periods with closer adherence to the modified Taylor rule. Switzerland is the only country for 
which the evidence of exchange rate predictability is stronger during periods of low and intermedi- 
ate Taylor rule deviations and Japan is the only country for which the evidence of predictability is stronger 
during periods of high deviations. The evidence is mixed for Australia, Canada, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom.19
We now evaluate predictability of the models during the periods when both central banks either 
adhere to or deviate from the Taylor rule simultaneously. The results for the original Taylor rule are 
reported in Table 9. The results do not support the hypothesis that out-of-sample exchange rate pre- 
dictability with Taylor rule fundamentals is stronger during periods when both countries are in periods 
of low deviations from the original Taylor rule. For the U.K., there is significant evidence of predict- 
ability with two of the five specifications during periods of low deviations in both the Fed and the 
Bank of England; however, it is not possible to identify any periods of high deviations for both central 
banks to make a comparison. 
18 The evidence of directional predictability is stronger for Australia and Sweden during the periods of low deviations from 
original Taylor rule, for Japan and the U.K. during periods of intermediate deviations from original Taylor rule, and no evi- 
dence of directional predictability is found for Canada and Switzerland. 
19 The evidence of directional predictability is stronger for Sweden and Switzerland during periods of low deviations from 
modified Taylor rule, for Australia, Japan and the U.K. during periods of high deviations from modified Taylor rule, and no ev- 
idence of directional predictability is found for Canada. 
Table 9 
CW statistics for Taylor rule fundamentals models: simultaneous deviations from original Taylor rule for the U.S. and different 
countries. 
Country Deviations No 
smoothing 
Smoothing 
differential FFR 
Smoothing 
individual FFR 
Smoothing 
differential 
shadow FFR 
Smoothing 
individual 
shadow FFR 
Australia 
1993:M10–2000:M9 Low −0.662 0.212 1.911** −0.133 1.581* 
2001:M1–2014M12 High 3.799*** 3.633*** 2.874*** 3.609*** 3.016*** 
Canada 
1985:M4–2000:M3 Low 1.475* 2.604*** 2.687*** 1.946** 2.020** 
2001:M1–2014:M12 High 2.281** 2.356*** 2.332*** 2.099** 2.259** 
Japan 
1999:M4–2000:M3 Low −1.453 0.111 −1.133 −0.518 −1.366 
– High – – – – – 
Sweden 
1994:M7–2000M12 Low 0.467 −0.390 −0.330 −0.411 −0.367 
2002:M4–2009:M12 High 2.604*** 2.585*** 2.708*** 2.610*** 2.710*** 
U.K. 
1988:M7–2000:M12 Low 1.151 0.963 1.274 1.286* 1.513* 
– High – – – – – 
Notes to Tables 9 and 10: The tables report the CW statistics for the tests of equal predictability between the linear model with 
Taylor rule fundamentals and random walk without drift. Tables 9 and 10 contain the results for the periods of simultaneous 
high and low deviations of the Fed and foreign country’s central bank from the original or modified Taylor rule fundamentals 
model. *, **, and *** denote test statistics significant at 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively, based on standard normal critical values 
for the CW statistic. Also, see notes to Table 1. 
Table 10 
CW statistics for Taylor rule fundamentals models: simultaneous deviations from modified Taylor rule for the U.S. and differ- 
ent countries. 
Country Deviations No 
smoothing 
Smoothing 
differential 
FFR 
Smoothing 
individual 
FFR 
Smoothing 
differential 
shadow FFR 
Smoothing 
individual 
shadow FFR 
Australia 
85:M1–99:M3 and 09:M9–14:M12 Low 1.695** 1.734** 1.727** 1.589* 1.784** 
1999:M4–2006:M9 High 1.254 1.501* 1.776** 1.409* 1.140 
Canada 
1985:M1–1999:M3 Low 1.797** 2.784*** 2.796*** 2.160** 2.202** 
2000:M1–2006:M9 High 1.573* 1.497* 1.554* 1.382* 1.265 
Japan 
1993:M10–1999:M3 Low −0.308 1.381* 2.764*** 0.457 2.513*** 
2005:M4–2006:M9 High 1.079 0.973 1.313* 1.086 1.619* 
Sweden 
94:M4–99:M3 and 09:M06–14:M12 Low 3.091*** 2.771*** 2.250** 2.790*** 2.174** 
2001:M4–2006:M9 High 1.319* 1.194 0.989 1.204 0.910 
Switzerland 
95:M4–99:M3 and 09:M10–14:M12 Low 0.247 0.398 0.903 0.290 1.133 
2006:M4–2006:M9 High −1.067 −1.367 −1.620 −1.529 −1.764 
U.K. 
90:M1–96:M12 and 06:M10–14:M12    Low 1.688** 1.849** 2.073** 2.178** 2.286** 
– High – – – – – 
The results for the modified Taylor rule are reported in Table 10. The results strongly support the 
hypothesis that out-of-sample exchange rate predictability with Taylor rule fundamentals is more suc- 
cessful during periods with closer adherence of both central banks to the modified Taylor rule. For 
Australia, Canada, Japan, and Sweden, the evidence of predictability is stronger during the periods of 
low Taylor rule deviations than during the period of high Taylor rule deviations for every model except 
the model with lagged individual interest rates for Canada. The only exception from this pattern is 
Table 11 
CW statistics for Taylor rule fundamentals models: Taylor rule principle. 
Country Taylor 
principle 
holds 
No 
smoothing 
Smoothing 
differential 
FFR 
Smoothing 
individual 
FFR 
Smoothing 
differential 
shadow FFR 
Smoothing 
individual 
shadow FFR 
Australia 1983:M3–1999:M3 Yes 0.811 1.012 1.299* 0.844 1.385* 
1999:M4–2007:M6 Mixed 1.731** 1.799** 1.659** 1.822** 1.115 
2007:M7–2014:M12 No 3.074*** 2.921*** 2.466*** 2.894*** 2.520*** 
Canada 1983:M3–1999:M3 Yes 1.698** 2.763*** 2.817*** 2.129** 2.190** 
1999:M4–2007:M6 Mixed 1.992** 1.916** 1.829** 1.811** 1.564* 
2007:M7–2014:M12 No 2.083** 2.499*** 2.513*** 2.466*** 2.512*** 
Denmark 1983:M3–1999:M3 Yes 0.229 0.199 0.343 0.213 0.007 
1999:M4–2007:M6 Mixed 1.094 0.718 0.864 0.686 0.455 
2007:M7–2014:M12 No 1.414* 1.564* 1.482* 1.753** 1.544* 
Germany 1983:M3–1999:M3 Yes −0.190 −0.124 1.056 0.420 1.219 
1999:M4–2007:M6 Mixed 1.016 0.815 0.612 0.715 0.608 
2007:M7–2014:M12 No 2.801*** 2.643*** 2.326*** 2.604*** 2.193** 
Japan 1983:M3–1999:M3 Yes −0.585 1.311* 1.803** 0.612 1.744** 
1999:M4–2007:M6 Mixed 0.293 1.154 1.198 0.712 0.929 
2007:M7–2014:M12 No 1.590* 1.747** 1.506* 1.731** 1.541* 
Sweden 1983:M3–1999:M3 Yes 0.866 −0.042 −0.206 0.094 −0.254 
1999:M4–2007:M6 Mixed 2.036** 1.676** 1.372* 1.762** 1.526* 
2007:M7–2014:M12 No 3.785*** 3.691*** 3.185*** 3.732*** 3.196*** 
Switzerland 1983:M3–1999:M3 Yes 1.172 1.508* 1.755** 1.354* 1.622* 
1999:M4–2007:M6 Mixed 1.248 0.259 0.292 0.056 −0.157 
2007:M7–2014:M12 No 1.134 0.861 1.034 0.775 0.883 
U.K. 1983:M3–1999:M3 Yes 1.675** 2.085** 2.198** 2.219** 2.294** 
1999:M4–2007:M6 Mixed 1.065 0.860 1.295* 1.144 1.269 
2007:M7–2014:M12 No 2.082*** 1.986** 2.031** 2.197** 2.173** 
Notes: The table reports the CW statistics for the tests of equal predictability between the linear model with original Taylor 
rule fundamentals and random walk without drift. The table contains the results for the periods of adherence to or violation of 
the Taylor principle for the U.S. *, **, and *** denote test statistics significant at 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively, based on 
standard normal critical values for the CW statistic. Also, see notes to Table 1. 
Switzerland, for which no evidence of predictability is found in either low or high deviations periods. 
As for the original Taylor rule, there is strong evidence of out-of-sample predictability during low de- 
viations periods with every specification, but the high deviations comparison does not exist. 
Monetary policy evaluation with Taylor rules is typically conducted in terms of the Taylor princi- 
ple that the nominal interest rate is raised more than point-for-point when inflation increases. This 
is both necessary and sufficient for stationarity of inflation in a textbook IS curve, Phillips curve, and 
Taylor rule model; and necessary and almost sufficient for determinacy of inflation in the forward- 
looking IS curve, New Keynesian Phillips curve, and Taylor rule model of Woodford (2003). 
Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy et al. (2015) identify low, positive, and negative deviations eras from the origi- 
nal and modified Taylor rule by conducting structural change tests on the difference between the actual 
and the prescribed federal funds rate. They use the difference, rather than the absolute value of the 
difference, between the rates to estimate Taylor rules over the sub-periods defined by the tests. For 
the period covered by our out-of-sample exchange rate forecasting, the Taylor principle holds during 
1983:M3–1999:M3 because the coefficient on inflation is significantly greater than one, the evi- 
dence is mixed between 1999:M4 and 2007:M6 because, while the coefficient on inflation is greater 
than one, it is not significantly greater than one, and the Taylor principle does not hold for 2007:M7– 
2014:M12 because the coefficient on inflation is less than one. 
Table 11 reports CW statistics for the Taylor rule fundamentals model when the data are divided 
into periods based on adherence to the Taylor principle for the U.S. Out-of-sample exchange rate pre- 
dictability with Taylor rule fundamentals is not more successful during periods of stronger adherence 
to the Taylor principle. For Australia, Denmark, Germany, and Sweden, the evidence of predictability 
is stronger during the periods of less adherence and, for Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom, the 
evidence of predictability is about the same in the high and low adherence periods. This pattern exactly 
matches the results for the original Taylor rule because the period where the Taylor principle holds 
closely overlaps the low deviations era and the periods where the evidence is mixed and where the 
Taylor principle does not hold closely overlap the high deviations era. The pattern is very different 
from the results with the modified Taylor rule because the overlap is much lower.20 
6. Conclusion
The Taylor rule fundamentals model of Molodtsova and Papell (2009) was motivated by the shift
in policy evaluation over the past twenty-five years from money supplies to interest rates as the in- 
strument of monetary policy. Using data from the start of the post-Bretton Woods floating exchange 
rate era in 1973 through the end of 2014, the model provides evidence of out-of-sample exchange 
rate predictability for all of the eight countries in our sample. The Taylor rule fundamentals model 
provides stronger evidence of predictability than the Taylor rule differentials model of Engel et al. (2008) 
and much stronger evidence of predictability than the traditional interest rate, Purchasing Power Parity, 
and monetary models. 
The most successful specifications allow for heterogeneous coefficients on domestic and foreign 
inflation and output gaps, but do not include the real exchange rate. These were also the most suc- 
cessful specifications in Molodtsova and Papell (2009), who use the data from 1983 through mid- 
2006. Thus,  we  demonstrate  that  out-of-sample exchange  rate  predictability  with  Taylor rule 
fundamentals has survived the financial crisis, the Great Recession, and the zero lower bound on the 
federal funds rate. 
Because the Taylor rule fundamentals model uses the variables included in the Taylor rule, U.S. and 
foreign inflation, output gaps, and (depending on the specification) lagged interest rates and/or the 
real exchange rate, but does not impose either postulated or estimated coefficients on the variables, 
finding evidence of out-of-sample exchange rate predictability does not, by itself, provide a link between 
the Taylor rule and the findings of predictability. To investigate whether there is a link between ad- 
herence of the Fed to the Taylor rule and out-of-sample exchange rate predictability, we use the Taylor 
rule deviations calculated by Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy et al. (2014), who use tests for multiple structural 
changes to identify periods of low and high deviations from both the original Taylor rule, with the 
coefficients as in Taylor (1993), and the modified Taylor rule, with a higher coefficient on the output 
gap as in Yellen (2012). 
The results with the modified Taylor rule strongly support the hypothesis that out-of-sample ex- 
change rate predictability with Taylor rule fundamentals is more successful during periods with closer 
adherence of the Fed to the modified Taylor rule, as the evidence of predictability is stronger during 
the periods of low Taylor rule deviations than during the period of high Taylor rule deviations for seven 
of the eight countries. The evidence of predictability is not, however, stronger when periods of high 
and low deviations are calculated from the original Taylor rule, calculated from Taylor rules for the 
foreign countries, or divided according by adherence of the Fed to the Taylor principle. 
The Taylor rule fundamentals model provides stronger evidence of  out-of-sample exchange 
rate predictability than the Taylor rule differentials model, and much stronger evidence than tradi- 
tional models. Using the modified Taylor rule, which doubles the output gap coefficient in the original 
Taylor rule and has been identified with Fed policy as articulated by Yellen (2012), we divide the 
period between 1983 and 2014 into low and high deviations eras. Out-of-sample exchange rate pre- 
dictability with Taylor rule fundamentals model is much stronger in low deviations eras than in high 
deviations eras. 
20 The evidence of directional predictability is stronger during the periods of less adherence to the Taylor principle for Aus- 
tralia, Denmark, and Japan. For Germany, Sweden, and the U.K, the evidence of directional predictability is about the same in 
the high and low adherence periods. No evidence of directional predictability is found for Canada. 
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